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DEMOCRATIZATION AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN TAIWAN:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BAD-LOAN CREATION
YUKIHITO SAT $O
This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan’s financial institutions are
interrelated with the society’s democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democ-
ratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the
Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the au-
thoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institu-
tions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial
institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government
to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial
system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local
factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to
funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as
the side effect of democratization.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS article looks at the relationship between democratization and the financialsystem1 in Taiwan during the 1990s, examining in particular the impact ofdemocratization on the growth of nonperforming loans (NPLs). By and large
the political and financial systems are independent of each other, and the workings
of one do not necessarily exert an influence on the workings of the other. Since in
Taiwan, however, the financial system had been incorporated into the authoritarian
political regime, the two systems were also linked together in their transformation
as Taiwan’s politics and economy experienced large-scale structural change during
the 1990s. One of the consequences of this inter-linkage was the increase in financial
institutions’ NPLs.
There are two significant reasons for explaining the inter-linkage between the
two systems. Firstly, the seriousness of Taiwan’s NPL problem which is the depen-
dent variable of this article. The present ratio of NPLs held by Taiwan’s financial
institutions has reached a level where caution is demanded. This has brought on a
1 A financial system has indirect financing carried out through financial institutions such as banks
and direct financing such as stock markets. This study deals solely with the former.
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credit crunch which has negatively affected the entire economy. Given Taiwan’s
insecure national standing, its economic deterioration could jeopardize its national
survival. Therefore, in order to devise appropriate measures to cope with the prob-
lem, it is essential that we understand the political and economic factors that have
led up to the present situation.
The second significant reason is the interconnection between democratization
and change in the financial system provides a good example of the multidimen-
sional transformation of Taiwanese society during the 1990s which is the theme of
this special issue. Our approach focuses on the autonomic dynamism of each sys-
tem and on the interplay among systems. By the end of the 1980s, the old financial
system as it stood had become increasingly ineffective, and there was a strong de-
mand for reforms. This was a driving force of the financial system itself. But the
reform would be entirely different and not thoroughgoing without the simultaneous
commencement of democratization because the financial system was a subsystem
of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime. For the same reason, the financial system had
been deeply affected by the change in the power structure brought on by democra-
tization during the 1990s. Now as a result of the presidential election in March
2000, there was a change for the first time of the party in power, and Taiwan has
now finished the process of democratic transition. At this stage, the power distribu-
tion in the political system is determining the speed and procedures for the disposal
of NPLs; at the same time, however, the ongoing reform of the financial system is
compelling more of the badly performing financial institutions to withdraw from
business, and this is rearranging the power structure of the political world.
The analytical method used in this study is an interdisciplinary approach. The
analysis will start from the dimension of the financial system itself, then proceed to
the political dimensions. Section II will first look at the growth of NPLs, then will
examine the causes for this growth, and from them pick out those causes which are
relevant to the political dimension. Section III will examine the relationship of those
causes with Taiwan’s democratization. This examination will follow two tracks.
One will analyze how changes in the political power structure brought on by de-
mocratization opened the way for political intervention into the financial system.
The second track will show how the ongoing reform of the financial system in
conjunction with the changes in the power structure led to the increase in NPLs.
The examination of changes in the power structure will focus on the relationships
between state and society, referring in particular to the relationship of the Kuomintang
(KMT) government with local factions (difang paixi)2 and business groups (caituan),
an area where a significant amount of research was carried out in Taiwan during the
1990s. The results of this analysis are summarized in Figure 1. Finally, Section IV
2 Local factions are political groups that control Taiwanese politics at the county level and below.
Their role under the former authoritarian regime and their activities in the democratizing process
are discussed below in this study.
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will summarize the above two sections and look at recent developments focusing
on the interrelationship between the political and financial systems.
Before ending this section, I would like to comment on some previous studies.
Democratization and its relationship with the economy including the financial sys-
tem has been researched extensively in Taiwan in recent years. The material of
interest to this study overlaps to a great extent with that contained in the volume
edited by Chu and Bau (2000),3 and one chapter of that volume, by Kuo, Chen, and
Huang (2000), is a direct precursor to the research of this study. The authors first
show the upward trend in the ratio of NPLs in the indirect financing system and
search out the political causes for this trend, pointing out the roles played by local
factions and business groups. This article is in agreement with their findings.
However their argument does not sufficiently bring together the relationship be-
tween political intervention in the financial system and the rise in NPLs. And al-
though the facts the authors present are all important, they are no more than ad hoc
circumstantial evidence. By comparison, this article, as summarized in Figure 1,
presents an overview of the entire chain of causality. Here the variables are inter-
connected through inferring the causes from the results retrospectively, i.e., analyz-
ing relations between factors from the right to the left of the figure. This article also
strengthens the evidences for its argument by referring to a number of scandals,
like the case of embezzlement that came to light at the Tungkang Credit Coopera-
tive, which more directly and clearly demonstrate the intervention of political power
in the financial system.
The authors also overemphasize the political factors, particularly the roles of the
KMT, business groups, and local factions, to the point that their discussion of these
factors tends toward reductionism. To avoid this reductionist problem, the present
study sees the financial system and its reform process as having a certain degree of
autonomy insulated from the influence of the political system.4 This approach al-
lows the following analysis to be more balanced and more comprehensive.
II. THE GROWTH OF OVERDUE LOANS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
A. Growing Volume of Overdue Loans
During the 1990s Taiwan’s financial system became increasingly unstable. In
1995 the Changhua Fourth Credit Cooperative failed which triggered a series of
runs on community banking institutions,5 and the Chungli and Yenpu agricultural
3 T. J. Cheng has also done more than a little research on the subject. See, for example, Cheng
(1997), Cheng and Schive (1997), Cheng (1999).
4 In an earlier study (Sat$o 2001), which is the basis for the present article, I recognized this problem,
but not to a sufficient degree. This has been rectified in this study.
5 Community banking institutions encompass the local credit cooperatives and the credit depart-
ments of the farmers’ and fishermen’s associations.
THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES230
cooperatives were rescued through mergers with other cooperatives. During the
latter half of 1998 Taiwan was hit by the aftereffects of East Asia’s economic crisis
which produced a wave of business bankruptcies that extended to the financial sec-
tor. Two bill-finance companies6 failed, and the Kwang San Group and Ever For-
tune Group respectively relinquished management rights in the Taichung Business
Bank and Pan Asia Bank. These financial institutions were all affiliated with busi-
ness groups and lent loans to other affiliated companies or guaranteed their com-
mercial paper. When the affiliated companies fell into difficulties or bankruptcies
because of the recession, the financial institutions could not escape being involved
(Abe, Sat$o, and Nagano 1999, pp. 44–54).
The upward trend in the ratio of overdue loans7 (shown in Figure 2) provides a
quantitative indication of the instability in the financial system. Three points can be
noted from the figure. One is that the ratio of overdue loans held by Taiwanese
financial institutions has already risen to a dangerous level. Taking into account
that the definition of overdue loans as defined by the Taiwanese financial authori-
ties is looser than the international standard, the problem is actually more serious.
Following the standard used by other countries, one source estimated that the ratio
of overdue loans would reach 9 per cent (Gongshang shibao, Sept. 13, 2000). A
second point is that from 1995 the ratio of overdue loans consistently trended up-
ward. Before that date the ratio remained substantially low, staying around the 1 per
cent level for banks (Kuo, Chen, and Huang 2000, p. 82, Table 1). The third point is
that the ratio of overdue loans at community banking institutions is extremely high
and rising at a rapid rate.
B. Main Factors for the Increase in Overdue Loans
According to interviews at financial institutions, government organizations and
with specialists in the field conducted during September and October of 2000 (see
Appendix Table I), two main reasons came out as causes for the rise in overdue
loans.8 The first was that changes in the industrial structure made a growing
number of NPLs. Starting from the latter half of the 1980s, Taiwan’s industrial
structure underwent great change. Many companies in the so-called traditional
6 These companies are unique to the Taiwanese financial system. Their business is mainly guarantee-
ing commercial paper and underwriting.
7 Overdue loans are a category of NPLs, and Taiwanese financial authorities define them as loans
having nonpayment of interest for six months and nonpayment of principal for three months. This
study uses overdue loans because it is easier to get data about them than unrecoverable loans.
8 Also some interviewee recognized the slow pace of the legal process in disposing of overdue loans
as another reason. An interesting argument that one interviewee pointed out was that the outflow of
funds in the 1990s had caused the stagnation of the real estate market. But whether this argument is
true or not depends on what these funds should have been used for had they not flowed overseas.
The question is outside of the scope of this study and is mentioned here only as one view expressed
in the interviews.
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industries9 experienced a slump in their business which hampered the repayment of
their loans. Many of them tried to overcome their depressed situation by diversify-
ing and investing overseas, but their efforts often resulted in failures which created
additional NPLs. The slump in the traditional industries also produced unemployed
workers who then could not repay their loans which further increased the amount
of bad loans.
The second main reason was inappropriate lending on the part of financial insti-
9 “Traditional industries” is a term used to designate those industries other than such newly develop-
ing industrial sectors as semiconductor and computer related industries. It encompasses a wide
range of industries, but the important ones for this study are the construction and real estate indus-
tries.
Fig. 2. Change in the Rate of Overdue Loans
Source: By the author from data obtained from the home-
page of the Taiwan Ministry of Finance (http://www.
boma.gov.tw).
Note: June 2000 is the projected rate of change.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Ju
ne
M
ar
.
Ju
ne
Se
p.
D
ec
.
M
ar
.
Ju
ne
Se
p.
D
ec
.
M
ar
.
Ju
ne
Se
p.
D
ec
.
M
ar
.
Ju
ne
M
ar
.
Ju
ne
Se
p.
D
ec
.
Se
p.
D
ec
.
Community banking
institutions
Overall rate
Domestic banks
Branches of foreign-
owned banks
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
(%)
THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES232
tutions. Loans to the real estate industry were especially problematic. Excess lend-
ing during the first half of the 1990s, as will be discussed later, led to a serious
oversupply of housing which created a large volume of NPLs. Another important
source of NPLs was loans for speculating in stocks. Before the 1990s very little
financing from financial institutions had been invested in the stock market, so when
the market crashed in 1990, there was little effect on these institutions. But during
the 1990s financial institutions provided an increasing amount of money for specu-
lation in the stock market. Moreover, most of the securities for this financing were
stocks. Consequently the fluctuation in stock prices since the latter half of the 1990s
has severely affected the performance of financial institutions. The cause of this
problem has been reforms in the financial system which at the start of the 1990s
opened the way for the establishment of new banks resulting in a dramatic increase
in the number of financial institutions. This increased the severity of competition,
and financial institutions, particularly new entrants to the industry, sought to culti-
vate loan markets by loosening their standards for lending.10
Moreover, some loans were extended even though from the start it was known
that their repayment was uncertain. As will be pointed out later, it became easy for
local factions and business groups to demand loans from financial institutions they
operated themselves, or to bring pressure on state-affiliated financial institutions
using their political clout.
It is difficult to show quantitatively how much of the growth in overdue loans has
been the result of change in the industrial structure or inappropriate lending. Al-
though the first factor seems to have had a larger impact, we cannot neglect the
second factor for the following two reasons. Theoretically, catastrophes such as
large-scale bank runs and distrust among the financial institutions in the call market
could take place were the instability of a financial system to go beyond a certain
critical point. Therefore, even though inappropriate lending in Taiwan has not been
relatively large, it has greatly increased the risk of the financial system’s collapse.
Empirically, most of the financial institutions that have gone bankrupt and those
where new management took over from the original owners were involved in inap-
propriate lending, particularly because of intervention by local factions and busi-
ness groups.
It is apparent that of the two main causes for the growing amount of overdue
loans, political factors lie behind the inappropriate lending. Changes in the political
power structure brought on by democratization have contributed to much of the
rampant increase in improper intervention. Also reform of the financial system com-
bined with changes in the power structure has encouraged the extension of inappro-
10 Another example is house loan programs. According to Cheng (2000, p. 273), the new banks began
to grant loans of 90 per cent in collateral value; until then the conventional financial institutions had
made loans of 70 per cent of the value. Moreover, interest rates at these new banks were lower than
at established banks.
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priate loans, and this itself has come about to some extent as part of changes in the
political system.
C. Causes for the High Ratio of Overdue Loans at Community Banking Institutions
As can be seen in Figure 2, the ratio of overdue loans at community banking
institutions is extraordinarily high. The high ratio is especially serious at the credit
departments of farmers’ and fishermen’s associations. According to the Council of
Agriculture, which is the competent authority over these associations, of the more
than 310 such credit departments, 50 of them as of the first half of 2000 reported
that over 30 per cent of their loans had fallen overdue, and 15 had liabilities in
excess of assets (Zhongguo shibao, June 1, 2000).
According to interviews with a division chief of the Council of Agriculture, sev-
eral factors unique to credit departments of farmers’ and fishermen’s associations
have caused their high ratios of overdue loans. One is the low liquidity of agricul-
tural land used as collateral which has made disposal difficult. Secondly, farmers’
and fishermen’s associations are a type of cooperative, therefore their credit depart-
ments are deficient as financial institutions because they have no capitalization;
they are not run by managerial specialists; and their area of business operations is
limited. In spite of these deficiencies Taiwan has developed no organization at the
national level to supplement them. In addition, recipients of loans from community
banking institutions were hit by the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and by the
earthquake in September 1999.
But these explanations are not sufficient. They do not explain why under the
same conditions there are community banking institutions that are comparatively
well managed and others that have gone bankrupt. Another important factor is that
more than a few community banking institutions are run by local factions. That
above-interviewed division chief agreed with this point. They lend money in line
with the interests of these factions, and this has have induced lax risk management
which has often produced overdue loans.11
Of course the connections between local factions and community banking insti-
tutions are nothing new. Therefore to understand why overdue loans have increased
so rapidly in recent years, we need to examine the relationship with democratization.
III. NEGATIVE INHERITANCE FROM THE ANCIEN RÉGIME AND
THE SIDE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
A. The Financial System as an Element in the Old Authoritarian Regime
1. The role of the financial system
In order to examine the political dimension behind the growth in NPLs, we need
11 See Chen Chieh-Hsuan (1995, p. 126) for the words of a secretary general of a farmers’ association.
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to understand how the financial system was designed under the previous authoritar-
ian political regime, because the destabilization of the financial system that has
come with democratization has its origins in the distinctive features of that system
during the authoritarian period.
After moving to Taiwan, the KMT government had two substantial threats to its
existence. One was the People’s Republic of China that the Chinese Communist
Party had established on the mainland, and the other was the power of the
benshengren, the local Taiwanese residents who had been living on the island for
generations. The following analysis is related to the latter threat. Many benshengren
harbored resentment against the KMT government because of the February 28 In-
cident and reacted against their exclusion from the national government. Some dared
to challenge the KMT regime, calling for the independence of Taiwan.
One of the important means that the KMT government employed to deal with
this threat was the financial system. The system was designed in part to curb any
rise in the power of the benshengren while it was also used in part to conciliate
them. The first task was accomplished with the establishment of a banking system
largely monopolized by state-owned banks; the latter was achieved by letting the
local factions operate the community banking institutions. In this way the financial
system became a subsystem of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime.
2. State-owned banking system
Until into the 1980s an outstanding feature of Taiwan’s financial system was that
the banking system was composed of state-owned banks12 (Liu 1975, the last chap-
ter; It$o 1988; Wade 1990, Chapter 6; Twu 1992; Cheng 1993; Fields 1995, Chapter
5). The only private banks were the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank which
had moved from the mainland, two overseas Chinese banks, and the branch offices
of foreign-owned banks. The participation of indigenous Taiwanese capital in the
financial sector was permitted only in institutions at the periphery of the sector like
investment trust companies,13 insurance companies, medium-sized business banks,14
and community banking institutions.
A banking system dominated by state-owned banks was set up for the express
purpose of maintaining the power of the government. The KMT government recog-
nized that for its own survival it would have to deal with two problems in running
12 In this study, banks and financial institutions in which the government holds over 50 per cent of the
stocks are referred to as state-owned. In Taiwan when the government’s holdings in a bank falls
below 50 per cent, it is regarded as privatized. But even in such cases the government remains the
single largest stock holder and is able to exercise strong influence. In this study such “privatized”
banks together with the state-owned banks and financial institutions are called state-affiliated banks/
financial institutions.
13 Financial institutions for receiving trusts and applying the funds to long-term investments.
14 Set up with the 1975 reform of the Banking Law, these banks were formed out of the reorganization
of mutual savings-and-loans companies which were traditional private financial institutions.
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the economy (Cheng 1993). One was assuring stability which particularly meant
controlling inflation. This concern derived from the KMT’s perception that one of
the major reasons for its loss of the mainland was its failure to control inflation. The
other problem, as mentioned above, was the need to prevent the latent threat of
benshengren power from developing too much in the economic sphere and turning
that economic power toward the political sphere.
Having a banking system in which most of the banks were state-owned over-
came both of these problems. The requisite stability was achieved because all banks
followed the Central Bank’s anti-inflationary financial policy. Being state-owned,
there was no concern that the banks would deviate from the government’s policy
line.
The second problem was overcome because by excluding indigenous capitalists
from the operation of banks, the KMT government prevented them from extending
their influence into the banking sector and from transforming themselves into mam-
moth business groups commanding both industrial and financial sectors. The KMT
government clearly showed its strong determination to obstruct the entry of indig-
enous capital into the banking industry when it countered attempts to revise the
Banking Law in the mid-1980s (Fields 1995, pp. 170–82; Wang 1996, pp. 114–19).
During the first part of the 1980s, Tsai Chung-chou, the head of the Cathay Plas-
tics Group and a lawmaker, organized the “Shisan xiongdi” (the thirteen brothers)
with twelve other lawmakers and drew up plans for revising the Banking Law to
permit investment trust companies to be transformed into banks. This was clearly a
challenge directed against the state-owned banking system. The revision bill was
amended and watered down to the point of ineffectiveness, and the challenge to the
system failed. But the matter did not end there. Tsai, the prime mover of the revi-
sion effort, was made to suffer greatly for his actions. In 1985 the Tenth Credit
Cooperative Association of Taipei, a subsidiary of Tsai’s Cathay Plastics Group,
was ordered by the authorities to suspend business operations which brought about
the collapse of the entire group. The reason given for the order to cease operations
was that Tsai had unlawfully withdrawn huge amounts of funds from the credit
cooperative. But it seems that had Tsai not presented a challenge to Chiang Ching-
kuo’s leadership and the state-owned banking system, the government would not
have chosen to shut down his credit association, which could have induced a financial
crisis in the whole financial system (Cheng 1993, pp. 84–85; Fields 1995, pp. 178–
89).
3. Local factions and community banking institutions
The KMT government did not solely work to hold down benshengren society. To
maintain stable control, it was also desirable to gain its support. In reality the KMT
government needed to obtain the votes of the benshengren in the local elections that
took place even under the authoritarian regime. The KMT government had few
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roots in local Taiwanese society, so it fostered local factions as its agents to win
over the benshengren (Wakabayashi 1992; Wu 1992; Tsai and Chang 1994; Chen
Ming-tong 1995). During elections local factions collected votes amongst the
benshengren for the KMT government by fielding their own candidates with KMT
endorsement or by supporting the KMT’s candidates. Through these efforts the
KMT was able to secure a certain amount of support from the benshengren.
In return for their support and assistance, the KMT government granted the local
factions certain economic privileges. According to Chu, four of the privileges they
enjoyed were the exclusive right to operate local monopoly business such as com-
munity banking institutions and transport facilities, financing from state-owned
financial institutions, conducting business with the local governments particularly
in the area of public construction, and the abuse of local government authority
especially arbitrary city planning (Chu 1989, p. 151). In this way, part of Taiwan’s
financial system was used in local faction privileges as a tool for maintaining the
KMT government.
But the relationship between the KMT government and the local factions did not
only have this symbiotic aspect; there was also an aspect of tension in the relation-
ship. While the government needed to rely on the local factions to maintain support
in local areas, it had to avoid letting factions develop too much influence and be-
coming a challenge to the government. For this reason it limited factions and the
power they wielded to their locales and did not let factions band together at the
national level. The government also fostered and supported more than two factions
in a locale, using them against one another to keep them under control and curb
their growth. Over the decades this central control gradually loosened, but it basi-
cally remained in place under the authoritarian regime.
4. Stability of the financial system during the authoritarian period
The financial system under the former authoritarian regime was exceedingly stable.
As noted in Section II, the ratio of overdue loans was kept at a very low level. Only
a few community banking institutions failed, which were merged with other insti-
tutions, and there were no bank failures at all.15
There were a number of reasons for this stability. One was the restriction on new
entrants into the system which along with the regulation of money and interest rates
restrained competition, so there was no need for financial institutions to venture
into high-risk financing. Another reason was that the government placed impor-
tance on stability in the financial system and maintained very strict control over the
state-owned banks. These banks were supervised and overseen by upwards to six-
15 For information about the major problems that occurred in the financial system during the decades
until the 1980s, see Lou et al. (1996, pp. 163–67). Regarding problems with banks, the only one
was a dispute in 1984 over management at the Bank of Overseas Chinese, which was one of the few
private banks.
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teen government offices, and their autonomy in the areas of personnel, accounting,
inspecting, budgeting, and administration was severely circumscribed. The employ-
ees of these banks were government workers, so there was no effort to do more than
mediocre work because any efforts on their part to innovate, even if successful,
would not be rewarded, while any failures were sure to be punished (Shea et. al.
1985, p. 48).
A third reason for the great stability was the small number of community bank-
ing institutions controlled by local factions that fell into serious trouble. This was a
result of the KMT’s effective control over the factions during the authoritarian pe-
riod which curbed serious wrongdoing and deviation in the management of the
community banking institutions. A fourth reason was the stability in the real estate
market that supported Taiwan’s financial system. And this stability was reinforced
by the prudent lending of financial institutions in the real estate market which curbed
overinvestment and rampant speculation. A final reason was that the stability of the
financial system itself permitted the effective functioning of a safety net where
troubled financial institutions could be merged with other institutions.
These factors that contributed to the stability of the financial system during the
period of the KMT’s authoritarian rule were lost in the process of democratization
and financial reform. More ironically, the close ties between the government and
the banks, and the operation of community banking institutions by local factions
started to function as destabilizing factors.
B. Democratization Increases the Burdens on the Financial System
1. Financial administration ill-prepared for reform
If a financial administration maintains its autonomy and works effectively, it is
enough to restrain inappropriate lending. That troubles arose in Taiwan’s financial
system during the 1990s indicates that the administration contained some defects.
One of these was that political power intervened not only in the financial institu-
tions but also in the financial administration, and harmed its autonomy. Another
shortcoming was that the financial administration was ill-prepared for and unable
to keep up with the great changes that took place in the financial system and the
political environment during the 1990s. This subsection examines the second prob-
lem more closely and an example of the first problem will be described later.
During the period of authoritarian government and the state-owned banking sys-
tem, there was only a low-level need for financial administration, particularly for
the supervision of financial institutions. Therefore financial administration was not
seen as very important as indicated by the designation of the office in charge of it.
It was ranked as a department (si), which put it below a bureau ( ju), within the
Ministry of Finance. (In July 1991 its ranking was raised to “ju.”) As a conse-
quence, its personnel and administrative resources were limited, and its organiza-
tional operations remained underdeveloped. The financial inspection staff in 1991
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numbered 141 people (Tiao 1991) and increased to 272 people by 1999 (RDEC
1999, p. 162), which indicates the shortage of staff at the beginning of the reform.
Some interviewee recognized that the present staff was still insufficient in number.
Operationally, there was a lack of uniformity and consistency in the accounting
practices and methods of financial institutions, therefore the office was unable to
use computers for analyzing their balance sheets and to give them early warnings
(Tiao 1991).
These deficiencies caused the financial administrative system to fail to properly
supervise Taiwan’s financial institutions in the midst of the great changes that took
place during the 1990s. Insufficient supervision offered an opening for political
intervention into the financial system.
2. Changes in the power structure and political interference in the financial system
(a) Changes in the power structure brought on by democratization
Democratization in Taiwan made remarkable progress after 1986. It also wrought
significant changes in the political power structure. In particular local factions and
business groups greatly increased their autonomy and political influence vis-à-vis
the KMT government.
A number of factors brought about the increased autonomy and power of the
local factions. One was the substantial increase in the importance of elections which
also became much more competitive. Despite this new situation, the KMT had to
continue relying on the local factions for waging its election campaigns (Wang
1996, pp. 152–56; Chen Ming-tong 1995, pp. 222–28). Another factor was the SNTV
(single, nontransferable vote in a multiple-seat district) system used in elections for
the Legislative Yuan (Legislature). Under this system success in elections came to
rely much more on a candidate’s own individual power and influence than on en-
dorsement by the KMT (Chu 2000, p. 14). A third factor was that national elections
opened the way for local factions to move into national-level politics, and there
they were able to form alliances with other local factions (Chen Ming-tong 1995,
pp. 228–33). Fourthly, as democratization progressed, the Legislative Yuan regained
its original authority and functions, and it again began to play an important role in
deciding political policies. This meant that unlike under the authoritarian regime
where the Legislative Yuan almost always automatically ratified decisions by the
Executive Yuan (the cabinet), under the emerging democratic system, the govern-
ment was no longer assured of getting the legislature’s approval.16 A fifth factor was
that Lee Teng-hui, who became the new leader of the KMT following the death of
Chiang Ching-kuo, was in conflict with the conservative wing of the party, and he
turned to the local factions and their members in the Legislative Yuan for support
16 Although the KMT government had a majority during the 1990s, it had great difficulty managing
the Legislative Yuan (Chu 2000, pp. 12–17).
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(Wang 1996, pp. 84–85). One last factor helping local factions increase their au-
tonomy and power was reforms in the intelligence service which reduced its ability
to control the factions.
The above factors also worked the same way for business groups that had origi-
nated from local factions. Groups with different backgrounds did not necessarily
care to use elections or the Legislative Yuan as sources for their power. But under
the emerging democratic system, the KMT and the different forces within the gov-
ernment found it necessary to gain the support of the major business groups, and
this gave these groups political clout.
Under democratization the local factions not only have greater autonomy and
more political influence, also seem to have further strengthened their desire to amass
money. Democratization has increased the frequency of elections, and the newly
founded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has become a powerful competitor
against the KMT. These have caused a substantial increase in the volume of money
that local factions are using in elections.
(b) Political interference in the financial system
The changes that took place in the political power structure have had two direct
effects on the financial system. One has been the increased autonomy of the local
factions and business groups which has allowed them to be more selfish and arbi-
trary in the way they manage their financial institutions. During the authoritarian
period, they would have feared being punished politically by the KMT govern-
ment, and for this reason they exercised a certain amount of self-control in their
activities including the management of their financial institutions. But that fear has
disappeared. In addition, with the KMT government having come to rely on the
local factions for its existence, there were times when it stepped in to rescue financial
institutions that fell into difficulties, and this has weakened the self-discipline of
the local factions all the more.
The second effect is the greater influence that politicians have come to have over
state-affiliated financial institutions. The state-owned banks are under the supervi-
sion of the national and provincial assemblies.17 Assembly members use this au-
thority to apply pressure on state-owned banks. Some of these banks have been
privatized, and they no longer need to have the supervision of the assemblies. But
as the largest single shareholder, the government still retains substantial influence
over decisions affecting personnel, therefore even these so-called privatized banks
have not been able to free themselves from the intervention of assembly members.
3. Democratization and establishment of new banks
Reform of the financial system in Taiwan has been progressing gradually since
17 The provincial assembly was abolished in 1998 and since then the Legislative Yuan has overseen
the financial institutions owned by the provincial government.
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the 1980s. A particularly important aspect of this has been permission to establish
new banks (1989 revision of the Banking Law, 1990 enactment of standards for
establishing banks, 1991 authorization to set up fifteen new banks) which has had
the effect of reforming the state-owned banking system. This reform combined
with the changes in the political power structure have contributed to the growth in
NPLs.
The immediate reason for opening up the banking sector to new private banks
was the exposure of functional limitations in the state-owned banking system brought
to light by problems of excess liquidity in the late 1980s. As pointed out earlier, the
state-owned banking system was extremely stable, but also too conservative to ad-
just itself to the rapid growth of Taiwan’s industrial sector. The regulation of inter-
est rates augmented its rigidity. As a result, an informal financing system had long
ago come into existence which supplemented the formal system (Shea et. al. 1985).
But it was during the latter half of the 1980s when the serious problem with excess
liquidity surfaced that the ineffectiveness in the state-owned banking system be-
came clearly acute. The banks were very limited in their ability to increase lending
to make use of the rapid growth in deposits, and in extreme cases they refused to
accept large deposits. Surplus funds with no place to go found their way into under-
ground investment companies. However these companies frequently failed because
of their reliance on speculative investments, and this became a serious social prob-
lem. This situation prompted moves to reform the financial system by allowing the
establishment of new banks (Yin 1991, pp. 42–43; Chu 1999, pp. 151–52).18
At the same time, however, this reform process was influenced by democratiza-
tion (Cheng 1993, pp. 90–91; Wang 1996, pp. 123–26; Chu 1999, p. 149). Had
banking reform not kept pace with democratization, it is possible that efforts would
have been made to solve the problems through other policies, and the choice of
setting up new banks would not have been taken. As pointed out in an earlier sec-
tion, the state-owned banking system had been set up as part of the authoritarian
regime of the KMT government. Some conservatives not only tried to obstruct de-
mocratization but also wanted to keep the state-owned banking system. Lee Teng-
hui, who was attempting to democratize Taiwan’s political system, promoted liber-
alization of the banking system and the establishment of new banks as one measure
toward bringing down the ancien régime. Lee made Shirley W.Y. Kuo, who, like
Lee, had been a professor in the Department of Economics at National Taiwan
University, head of the Ministry of Finance, and they pressed ahead with reforms
while holding down the efforts of Yu Kuo-hwa, head of the Executive Yuan, who
fought to preserve the state-owned banking system (Chen 1989; Hsu 1989).
18 Another factor was external pressure which was urging the Taiwanese government to allow the
entry of foreign financial institutions. Consequently it was compelled to liberalize the entry of new
domestic financial institutions at the same time (Cheng 1993, p. 90; RDEC 1999, p. 117).
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However, the banking system reforms also opened the way for local factions and
business groups to enter the financial sector. During the years of strict controls on
new entrants, they had seen the banks enjoying excess profits, so when it became
clear that the government was going to open up the banking system to new entrants,
local factions and business groups expressed their desire en masse to set up new
banks. This had two detrimental effects on the financial system.
One was the sudden increase in the number of banks. Originally the financial
authorities had planned to approve between three and five new banks (Tseng 1991a,
p. 86; Chu 1999, p. 152). In fact, however, fifteen new banks received approval, and
major business groups and local factions were participants in most of them (Tseng
1991b). Many observers believe that most of these new banks were approved be-
cause of pressure on the Lee Teng-hui government (Tseng 1991a). Caught up in
political battles within the KMT, it seems that Lee needed their support and could
not reject their demands. Furthermore, several investment trust companies, me-
dium-sized business banks, and credit cooperatives were reorganized into banks,
by the end of 1999, forty-seven banks had come into existence compared to sixteen
before the banking system was opened. Such an increase in the number of banks
greatly intensified competition. Banks had to become more aggressive in their lend-
ing, and the quality of their loans deteriorated.
The second negative effect was that some of the new banks had questionable
reasons for being established and had relied on political clout to pressure officials
into approving their establishment. From the start of the reforms there were fears
that they would illegally lend money to the business groups which owned them.
This happened at the Chung Sing Bank, one of the new banks. This scandal, which
is discussed further below, came to light in 2000.
4. Scandals expose the banking system’s problems
The above three subsections show how political factors have been a mechanism
for creating NPLs. This mechanism is common knowledge within Taiwan’s financial
sector, administrative authority, and political world. But it has not been easy to find
objective, demonstrable proof of this mechanism. So the problems remained out of
sight until scandals revealed their existence and brought them to public attention.
(a) Chungli City Farmers’ Association of Taoyuan County
This farmers’ association experienced a run on its deposits in 1995, and in the
following year it was absorbed by the Taiwan Provincial Farmers’ Association.
During the course of the year before the run occurred, the Ministry of Finance had
sent three official notifications to the Taoyuan county government which had au-
thority over the association telling it to relieve the secretary general who was in
immediate charge of running the association. However the county government ig-
nored these notices, apparently because the head magistrate of Taoyuan county at
that time, Liu Pang-yu (who was later assassinated), was also the leader of the local
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faction, and the secretary general of the farmers’ association was a faction member
(Tiao 1995).
This case exemplifies the problem of the Ministry of Finance of the central gov-
ernment finding its authority unable to match the political clout of the local faction,
and the ministry loses the ability to regulate the community banking institution
operated by that faction. In other words, along with its insufficient capabilities as
mentioned above, the financial administration has also been limited by the political
power growing in the democratization process.
(b) Tungkang Credit Cooperative
In 1999 an inspection by the Central Department Insurance Corporation uncov-
ered suspicions that the chairman of the Tungkang Credit Cooperative, Kuo Ting-
tsai, and other members of the staff had been counterfeiting securities and embez-
zling from the deposits in the credit cooperative. Kuo was an important person in
the Chang faction, one of the two big factions in Pingtung county, and was a mem-
ber of the Legislative Yuan. He was also close to Ong Da-ming, who was leader of
the Hualon group and very influential in the political and financial world. Kuo was
regarded as Ong’s spokesman in the Legislative Yuan (Kang 1999, p. 54). In No-
vember 2000 the district court sentenced Kuo to imprisonment for twelve years at
hard labor for embezzling 2.3 billion New Taiwan dollars from the credit coopera-
tive (Taiwan Pingtung District Court 2000).
This case is a complex of the various elements in Taiwan’s financial system dur-
ing the 1990s. It shows that some community banking institutions were being run
as the private possessions of the local factions. The head accountant of the Tungkang
Credit Cooperative, Hsu Shu-chin, had played a central role in carrying out the
crime, and she was also Kuo’s secretary in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan Pingtung
District Court 2000, p. 35). The case also shows the collusion with business groups.
Along with embezzling from the cooperative, Kuo and his group used counterfeit
securities as paid-in capital to set up the Fahua Securities Investment Trust Com-
pany in 1996. At the time an individual named Lin Hsiu-fen was one of the people
deeply involved (Taiwan Pingtung District Court 2000, pp. 60–61, 64). Lin had
been a former secretary to Ong Da-ming (Jen 1999, p. 49). (She along with Ong
had previously been convicted of illegal stock transactions.)
A third point in this case was the use of the money that Kuo and his group em-
bezzled. According to newspaper reports, part of it was used to provide for subordi-
nates (“tsngaka” in Taiwanese, “zhuangjiao” in Mandarin) who had the task of
collecting votes during elections (Jingji ribao, Sept. 1, 1999). In effect Kuo used
his economic privileges to build up political influence. A fourth point was that state-
affiliated banks, notable the Farmers Bank of China, invested funds in the Fahua
Securities Investment Trust Company that Kuo’s son managed (Jingji ribao, July 8,
1999). Kuo was considered to have pressured the banks to invest taking advantage
of his position on the finance committee of the Legislative Yuan. In other words, it
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showed a mechanism which used political authority, especially a Legislative Yuan
member’s influence on state-affiliated banks, to yield economic rent. When this is
put together with the third point, one can see a mechanism where economic rent
and political influence mutually assure one another.
(c) The Chung Shing Bank
A succession of scandals revealing political interference in the financial system
broke out during the year 2000. The Chung Shing Bank scandal in particular ex-
posed the problems existing in the newly established banks.
The chairman of the Chung Shing Bank, Wang Yu-yun, was the leader of the
Wang faction, one of the three big local factions in Kaoshiung city. He had also
been a member of the Legislative Yuan and the head of the Hua Eng group. Suspi-
cions were that in 1998 Wang had used false names to provide financing to Huang
Tsung-hung, governor of the Taiwan Pineapple group, that went beyond the legal
limit. There were also suspicions that Top Construction & Development, a com-
pany run by Wang’s son, had received kickbacks from Huang (Zhongguo shibao,
June 11, 2000).
Letting new banks enter the banking system had raised fears that the local fac-
tions and business groups who were the primary entities setting up the new banks
would essentially make these banks their own possessions in order to facilitate the
procuring of their own funds. The Chung Shing Bank scandal proved that these
fears had been correct.
5. A mechanism creating excess investment in the real estate market
Many of the NPLs are connected with the real estate industry, therefore this prob-
lem needs to be examined more closely. The reason real estate has such a conspicu-
ously large amount of NPLs is because of overinvestment in the 1990s. The bubble
in the real estate market burst in 1990, and the adjustment phase set in. As men-
tioned above, this crash had little influence on financial institutions. However, regu-
lations on floor space ratios were to be introduced from 1992, so most developers
rushed to submit their construction projects for approval before the new regulations
took effect. This assured that there was going to be an excess of supply in the real
estate market, and the glut has continued to the present. At the start of 1999 there
were estimated to be 850,000 unsold homes on the market (RDEC 1999, p. 177).
Within  the  context  of  this  study,  two  factors  can  be  pointed  out  for  the
overinvestment in the real estate market. One was that regulations on floor space
ratios were introduced at the same time that the new banks were established. The
many new banks needed to develop lending markets, therefore they were quite easy
in offering financing to the real estate and construction industries at that time. As
Figure 3 shows, the rate of lending to construction companies as a portion of total
bank lending coincides perfectly with the approvals for home construction.
The other factor is the possibility that the rent creation mechanism of the local
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factions and some of the business groups accelerated the excess investment in the
real estate market. Reports and research in recent years have shown clearly that
these factions and groups have built rent creation mechanisms centered on land
development (Tienhsia Pienchi 1992; Chen Dung-Sheng 1995; Wang 1996, Chap-
ter 5; Jou and Chen 1998). Through their control of local governments, local fac-
tions and business groups have acquired the authority to intervene in urban plan-
ning. Using this authority they have changed the classification of agricultural land
to residential and commercial land, incorporated sloped land (shanpodi) into urban
planning areas, manipulated the choice of locations for urban land adjustment (shidi
chonghua); through such intervention they have been able to reap enormous finan-
cial returns. And of course the needed funding in the whole process has been sup-
plied via their financial privilege, meaning the financing from community banking
institutions and state-affiliated financial institutions.
Democratization, on the one hand, enhanced the autonomy of local factions and
business groups; at the same time, the increased frequency of elections pushed up
expenditures; the former factor provided opportunities and the latter created moti-
vations for the factions and business groups to abuse the above rent creation mecha-
nism. But the party could not last forever. It exacerbated excess supply, and the real
estate market fell into serious stagnation.
Fig. 3. Home Construction and Bank Lending to the Construction Industry
Sources: By the author using data from the Construction and Plan-
ning Administration, Ministry of Interior homepage (http://www.
cpami.gov.tw/) and Economic Research Department, the Central Bank
of China, The Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, the Re-
public of China.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE INTERACTION OF DEMOCRATIZATION
AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
This article along with others in this special issue have sought to understand Taiwan’s
transformation in the 1990s as multidimensional. The core points of this approach
are that each of the many spheres of a society has to a certain degree its own au-
tonomy and that therefore any two spheres have a bilateral relationship, where a
change in one sphere affects and induces change in the other and vice versa. Re-
garding democratization and the financial system in Taiwan, the former clearly has
its own dynamism. In the case of the latter, it had been a subsystem of the authori-
tarian governing system, therefore its reform became interlinked with democratiza-
tion of the political system. However, by the end of the 1980s, reform of some sort
could no longer be avoidable with or without democratization because it became
clearly evident that the financial system itself had serious defects and could not
accommodate itself to rapid economic development. For this reason it is not appro-
priate to see reform of Taiwan’s financial system only as one part of the democrati-
zation process.
Regarding the interaction of different social spheres, up to this point this study
has focused solely on one matter, the impacts of democratization on the financial
system, particularly the negative ones. Changes in the political power structure that
came with democratization increased political intervention in the financial system.
It also led to the distortion of financial system reform (which started simultaneously
with democratization) such as the excess number of banks and the entry of unqualified
financial institutions. In these two ways, democratization has contributed to the
substantial increase in NPLs.
The rest of this article will examine both directions of the interaction between
the political system and the financial system focusing on recent events concerning
the NPL problem. First, the change of government that took place with the elec-
tions of March 2000 has altered the actions of the political system on the financial
system. In that election, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian defeated Lien Chan of the KMT
and James Soong, who seceded from the KMT, which brought about a successful
change of government. This change has had both positive and negative effects on
the financial system, particularly for solving the NPL problem and for the sound-
ness and stability of the financial system.
On the negative side, despite having succeeded in bringing about a change of
government, the Chen regime’s authority has been too weak to implement mea-
sures needed for reforming the financial system. One weakness is in the area of
government finance. Although the government has already strengthened deposit
insurance and established the Financial Reconstruction Fund to stabilize the financial
system, these schemes probably are not sufficient and further infusion of public
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funds will be necessary. This raises the pressure for tax increases, but at the same
time there are strong demands for tax reductions. Caught up in these contending
issues, there is no certainty that the Chen government will be able to get sufficient
public money injected into the financial system.
Another weakness of the new government is the minority standing of the DPP in
the Legislative Yuan. For more than a year and a half after Chen Shui-bian assumed
the presidency in May 2000, his government had to face a Legislative Yuan where
the DPP held less than one-third of the seats, which had been determined by the
1998 election. Following the election that took place in December 2001, the DPP
became the largest party, but it still does not control a majority in the Legislative
Yuan, even together with the Taiwan Solidarity Union which has shown its coop-
eration. This minority standing has made it difficult for the government to get the
support it needs in the Legislative Yuan when trying to hammer out reform policies.
This has been the case particularly over policies to deal with the community bank-
ing institutions which directly affect the vested interests of the local factions.
On the positive side of the change of government, there has been some success in
efforts to remove from the financial system the interference of local factions and
other influential groups having symbiotic relations with the KMT. The series of
scandals, including the one at the Chung Shing Bank, have come to light because
the authorities have been able to expose the illegal and corrupt activities involving
financial institutions. The government has been reshuffling personnel on the boards
of state-affiliated financial institutions, and has been making efforts to prevent out-
side interference in these institutions (Yang 2000). In August 2001 it took its first
substantive steps to clean up the NPL problem. It undertook the forcible seizure of
thirty-six farmers’ and fishermen’s associations which had extraordinarily high ra-
tios of NPLs. But the initial plan to set up a National Agricultural Bank and have it
absorb the seized financial departments did not go through, and instead they have
been absorbed by existing banks. This outcome indicates the government’s con-
tinuing weakness.
Turning next to examining the effects that actions of the financial system have
had on the political system, the essential point is that Taiwan’s financial system is
operating more autonomously than before and is compelling local factions and busi-
ness groups to provide restitution, which includes withdrawal from the financial
system, to compensate for their rent-seeking. At the macro level of the financial
system, the entry of local factions and business groups relying on their political
influence has made the system severely competitive, and as a result they have not
been able to realize the excess profits they had anticipated. At the micro level, be-
cause of NPLs accumulated through rent-seeking, some financial institutions run
by local factions and business groups have experienced runs on their deposits. They
have also found that their political influence has not been able to completely close
off supervision and seizure by the government’s financial authorities. As a result,
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financial institutions too avaricious in their rent-seeking have sooner or later found
their business has come to a dead end; or even worse, as with the Tungkang Credit
Cooperative and the Chung Shing Bank, they have been prosecuted for their crimes.
And once local factions and business groups have lost financial institutions as sources
of rent, they inevitably lose their political influence.19
Looking into the future, the ideal scenario is for the government to continue its
efforts to curb the power and influence in the political system of local factions and
business groups and build sound institutions to promote the stability of the financial
system, which will make badly performing financial institutions exit from that sys-
tem. This should ultimately reduce the political clout of the local factions and busi-
ness groups economically dependent on those financial institutions. Unfortunately,
the power and influence of the local factions and business groups within the politi-
cal system remains strong and may prevent the above-mentioned scenario from
moving ahead smoothly. Therefore, the danger has not yet been entirely removed
that the financial system could break down under the weight of NPLs.
19 Although the district court had already found him guilty of embezzling from the Tungkang Credit
Cooperative, Kuo Ting-tsai tried to get reelected to the Legislative Yuan in the election of Decem-
ber 2001. He appeared to be a strong contender during the early stage of the campaign, but in the
end he received only about 16,000 votes; more than 35,000 were needed to win.
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APPENDIX TABLE I
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 2000
Government
organizations
Financial institutions
Political parties and
statesmen
Researchers specializing
in financial system
Researchers specializing
in Taiwan’s politics and
society
The Central Bank of China (Sept. 25);
Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance (Sept. 26);
Financial Analysis Department, Council for Economic Planning and De-
velopment, Executive Yuan (Sept. 27);
Economic Research Department, Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Executive Yuan (Oct. 3);
Agricultural Finance Division, Farmers’ Service Department, Council of
Agriculture, Executive Yuan (Oct. 5);
Central Deposit Insurance Corp. (Oct. 6)
Two branches of Japanese banks (Sept. 22),
Two previous chairmen of banks (Oct. 3, 4),
State-affiliated financial institution (Oct. 5)
National Policy Foundation (the KMT’s think tank) (Sept. 22),
A lawmaker of the DPP (Sept. 26),
A lawmaker of the New Party (Sept. 29)
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (Sept. 21, Oct. 4);
A professor of the Department of Banking, National Chengchi Univer-
sity (Sept. 27);
Taiwan Research Institute (Sept. 29);
A professor of the Department of Economics, National Taiwan Univer-
sity (Oct. 6)
A professor of the Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University
(Sept. 21);
A professor of the Department of Sociology, Tunghai University (Oct. 2)
Note: Date of interview in parentheses.
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